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In response to Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Inno-
cence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79 (2005). 
 
To the lawyers and judges who work in the criminal justice system, 
plea bargaining seems an efficient, fair, and perhaps even necessary 
means of resolving the ever-increasing number of criminal cases they 
face.  However, to those who view plea bargaining from the outside, 
the practice appears unseemly at best, and at worst, a profound threat 
to the system’s goals of finding the truth and doing justice.
1
  Yet per-
sistent outsider criticism—much of it emanating from the legal acad-
emy—has failed to weaken plea bargaining’s hold.
2
  As a result, most 
of the recent scholarship on plea bargaining starts with the assump-
tion that plea bargaining is here to stay; the current agenda is thus 
one of reform, not abolition.
3
 
The turn to incrementalism, however, presents an important 
theoretical challenge.  Once one abandons a categorical rejection of 
plea bargaining as inherently coercive, fatally inconsistent with the 
criminal justice system’s purpose of moral condemnation, or toxic to 
the effective functioning of the adversarial process, then one must de-
velop a more complicated normative framework that is capable of en-
dorsing some plea deals while disapproving of others.  Such a frame-
work must be true, on the one hand, to the lived experience of the 
criminal justice system’s insiders, recognizing the reality that most de-
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fendants are guilty, few cases present genuine disputes of material 
fact, and mounting caseloads require expedited procedures.  At the 
same time, that framework must acknowledge the deeply felt intuition 
of outsiders that, for all of its efficiency, something profoundly impor-
tant that goes to the heart of what we mean by “criminal justice” has 
been lost in the move from trials to deals.  For all of its creativity and 
insight, the new generation of plea bargaining scholarship has yet to 
meet this challenge in a fully satisfactory manner. 
Professor Wright’s article exemplifies the very best of the new 
scholarship.  He recognizes the need for what he terms a “mid-level 
theory” of plea bargaining; that is, a normative framework that will 
help us to move from the “enervating” abolition debate to a “regula-
tory strategy” that shows us how to “sort the good plea bargains from 
the bad ones.”
4
  To this end, he proposes a “‘trial distortion’ theory”:  
criminal courts, he asserts, “produce too many dysfunctional guilty 
pleas when those guilty pleas distort the pattern of outcomes that 
would have resulted from trials.”
5
  To illustrate the operation of his 
theory, Professor Wright offers a marvelously subtle analysis of federal 
case disposition trends over the past sixty years, raising considerable 
doubt as to whether plea bargaining in the federal system can pass the 
trial distortion test.
6
  Finally, he suggests some specific reforms that 
might help bring the federal system into closer conformity with the 
nondistortion ideal.
7
 
Despite my deep admiration for this and for all of Professor 
Wright’s work, I have my doubts about whether his trial distortion 
theory marks out the most promising track for plea bargaining re-
form.  To be clear, I have no quarrel with his central empirical claims: 
(1) over a period of more than three decades, guilty pleas have been 
steadily displacing acquittals in the federal system;
8
 
(2) the declining acquittal rate is more persuasively explained by refer-
ence to trial distortion than by improved case screening and trial prepa-
ration by prosecutors;
9
 and 
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2007] WHAT’S GOOD ABOUT TRIALS? 211 
(3) the apparent trend toward trial distortion is likely connected to the 
adoption of new sentencing laws that have greatly enhanced the plea-
bargaining leverage enjoyed by prosecutors.
10
 
Nor do I disagree with the specific reforms he proposes for federal 
sentencing law, which I think would make good sense even in the ab-
sence of trial distortion. 
My doubts relate not to the existence of trial distortion, but to its 
significance.  Trial distortion may be a genuine problem, but it is not 
likely a big problem (at least in the federal system), and it almost cer-
tainly does not capture any large part of the outsider discomfort with 
plea bargaining (at least outside the legal academy). 
I elaborate on these points as follows.  Part I identifies more spe-
cifically the problems that are and are not targeted by trial distortion 
theory.  Part II calls into question whether trial distortion (as concep-
tually distinct from wrongful conviction of the innocent) truly is an 
inherent evil.  Finally, Part III suggests an alternative normative 
framework for plea bargaining reform, one that focuses on fair process, 
rather than the replication of trial outcomes. 
I.  THE NATURE OF THE “TRIAL DISTORTION” PROBLEM 
In targeting “trial distortion,” Professor Wright’s principal con-
cern seems to lie with one particular class of defendants:  those who 
plead guilty but who would have been acquitted had they gone to 
trial.
11
  At the outset, it should be noted that in all likelihood this is a 
very small percentage of the total number of defendants.  For in-
stance, as Professor Wright’s data reveal, acquittals and mistrials 
reached a postwar high of only 5.5% of adjudicated federal cases.
12
  In-
deed, over the entire period between 1945 and 1980, the rate of ac-
quittals and mistrials almost always stayed below 5% and was often be-
low 4%—a mere three percentage points higher than the most recent 
number.
13
  Given this reality during the “golden age” of federal acquit-
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Id. at 132. 
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tortion story.  These are cases that might have resulted in a defendant’s free-
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Id. at 102 fig.2. 
13
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tals, but not dramatically so.  Moreover, as Professor Wright observes, given the various 
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tals, then even the elimination of all guilty pleas in cases that would 
otherwise end in acquittal is unlikely to make a dramatic difference in 
the federal criminal justice system.  Put differently, there is every rea-
son to believe that the vast majority of federal defendants would still 
find themselves convicted in a world without trial distortion, just as 
they are in our current fallen state. 
In any event, there is a real disconnect between the broad scope 
of public complaints about plea bargaining, many of which Professor 
Wright ably catalogs at the beginning of his article,
14
 and a particular 
focus on “acquittable” defendants.  A normative framework that takes 
the outsider criticisms seriously should also have something to say 
about the clearly guilty defendants:  How large a sentencing break 
should they get?  What role should victims have in the plea bargaining 
process?  What procedural rights should we permit the defendant to 
surrender, and how can transparency and public accountability be en-
sured?  Trial distortion theory suggests an oversimplified binary analy-
sis (guilty or not guilty); even if we get that threshold question right in 
every case, there may still be plenty of room to question whether a 
“criminal justice” system dominated by plea bargaining is really worthy 
of the name.
15
 
 
although most of my comments regarding acquittals would also apply with much the 
same force to dismissals. 
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the exact crime to which the defendant pleads.  See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
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gress).  Moreover, even assuming that that the trial distortion problem encompasses a 
significantly larger number of defendants than simply the acquittables, the incre-
mental harm of convicting a guilty defendant of the “wrong” crime (with uncertain 
sentencing consequences) seems considerably less compelling than that of convicting a 
defendant who would have otherwise escaped punishment altogether. 
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II.  CONVICTING THE ACQUITTABLE:  WHERE’S THE HARM? 
There is another important problem with focusing on the acquit-
tables:  despite their potential success at trial, they chose to plead 
guilty, most likely because they received a substantial benefit for doing 
so.  As Professor Wright observes, in cases in which the government’s 
evidence is weak, “the discount that a prosecutor offers might grow 
quite large, because a lucrative offer is needed to convince a defen-
dant to give up a strong chance of outright acquittal.”
16
  And even if 
they surrender potentially successful defenses—trials, after all, are in-
herently unpredictable—the defendants who get the best deals hardly 
seem the most deserving of our sympathy.  Indeed, even apart from 
the benefits offered by the prosecutor, there are many good reasons 
why it may be in the best interests of even an acquittable defendant to 
plead guilty, including the minimization of legal fees; the termination 
of tedious, intrusive, and otherwise stressful court proceedings; and 
the opportunity to accept responsibility for morally blameworthy con-
duct (notwithstanding the potential absence of legal liability).  So 
where’s the harm in trial distortion? 
In answer to this question, Professor Wright directs our attention 
away from the defendants and toward the public at large.
17
  He sug-
gests two reasons the public may lose when an acquittable defendant 
pleads guilty.  First, he asserts, “[A] guilty plea cuts short the public’s 
chance to learn details about the facts in the case because the factual 
basis for the plea, as described at the plea hearing, will offer only a 
quick sketch of the evidence.”
18
  Fair enough, but this is not really an 
argument for trial distortion theory so much as a criticism of plea bar-
gaining generally.  The public loses an opportunity to learn more 
about the case whenever a defendant pleads guilty, regardless of the 
defendant’s likelihood of acquittal at trial. 
Wright’s second area of concern relates more directly to trial dis-
tortion.  He focuses here on legitimacy: 
Because the criminal system emphasizes public responses to alleged viola-
tions of public values, the need to demonstrate the legitimacy of the 
criminal justice system must trump the preferences of defendants.  At 
some point, the purchase of too many uncertain convictions undermines 
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18
Id. at 110. 
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our confidence that the system is leading to the accurate results neces-
sary for legitimacy.
19
 
Upon closer inspection, however, these legitimacy interests provide 
only tepid support for trial distortion theory, and by no means clearly 
outweigh the individual interests of acquittable defendants in avoiding 
risky legal proceedings and getting the best possible plea deals. 
There are at least two important problems with the legitimacy ar-
gument.  First, there is the information asymmetry:  typically, only the 
insiders know when a case is weak, and they usually have little incen-
tive to undermine an otherwise agreeable plea deal by publicizing the 
likelihood of a defendant’s acquittal.  To be sure, there are occasion-
ally high-profile cases in which the media diminishes the asymmetry 
and informs the public of viable defenses.  But, even in such cases, it is 
unclear to what extent the lay public will ultimately question the ex-
pert decisions of the prosecutors who offer the plea deal or the judge 
who ultimately accepts the guilty plea.  Nor is it clear that the public’s 
view of the plea bargaining process is shaped more by the occasional 
unreliable conviction that comes to its attention than by the far 
greater number of guilty pleas routinely reported in the press without 
any question as to their accuracy. 
Second, even assuming that the public somehow learns of a sub-
stantial number of guilty pleas by defendants who might otherwise win 
acquittal, there are good reasons to doubt that any sizeable subsection 
of the public would disapprove of such dispositions.  Bear in mind 
that this is not a discussion solely concerning demonstrably innocent 
defendants, but merely those defendants who stand a good chance of 
winning at trial.  A defendant might win as a result of any number of 
factors that do not really cast doubt on his or her guilt, such as the 
suppression of perfectly reliable evidence of guilt, the unwillingness or 
inability of a key witness to testify or to testify persuasively, the failure 
of the prosecutor to pursue the most appropriate charges, and so 
forth.  Moreover, in light of the applicable burden of proof, a jury may 
acquit even if the evidence establishes that it is more likely than not 
that the defendant is guilty.  In all of these circumstances, the public 
may justifiably prefer to see the probably guilty defendant convicted 
through a plea bargain than let off with no punishment at all.
20
  In-
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Lending some support to this view, one recent empirical study found a statisti-
cally significant increase in the level of support for plea bargaining when the role of 
plea bargaining was explained in terms of avoiding the possibility of acquittal of de-
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deed, to put the matter even more starkly, I suspect that the system’s 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public is more threatened when a defen-
dant who is believed by the public to be guilty wins at trial (especially 
when the win is attributed to a “legal technicality”) than when a 
prosecutor secures a guilty plea notwithstanding the possibility of a 
successful defense (especially when the defense does not establish ac-
tual innocence).  In the latter case, the system is at least displaying 
some consideration for the demands of retributive justice and public 
safety. 
To be sure, the set of acquittable defendants must include some 
who are demonstrably innocent, and the conviction of such defen-
dants via a guilty plea does raise serious legitimacy issues.  However, 
given the broad scope of federal criminal law, the quality of the inves-
tigative resources available to federal prosecutors, and the ability of 
federal prosecutors to cherry-pick their cases, I doubt there are many 
federal defendants who qualify as demonstrably innocent.  Moreover, 
even to the extent that such defendants exist and choose to plead 
guilty, it is not clear how the public is to become aware of them.  An 
acquittable defendant’s own protestations of innocence will doubt-
lessly be discounted by the public as self-serving.  Moreover, as Josh 
Bowers has recently demonstrated, the defendants most likely to be 
wrongfully convicted via plea bargains are prior offenders, who tend 
to draw a disproportionate share of law enforcement attention.
21
  Yet, 
for the same reason that they are apt to attract false charges, repeat 
offenders are also unlikely to get any benefit of the doubt from the 
public.  In short, troubling as they may be in theory, guilty pleas by the 
truly innocent do not seem in practice a strong threat to the perceived 
legitimacy of the federal criminal justice system. 
III.  AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH:  TRIAL PROCESS OVER TRIAL 
OUTCOMES 
Despite my doubts about trial distortion theory, I am in full 
agreement with Professor Wright as to the need for some sort of regu-
latory strategy that will help to distinguish between good and bad plea 
 
fendants at trial.  Herzog, supra note 1, at 606. 
21
See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) 
(manuscript at 8, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=983819) (“[R]ecidivists are 
overrepresented among innocent defendants and probably comprise the majority of 
the population because institutional biases select for their arrest, prosecution, and trial 
conviction.”). 
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bargaining practices.  I would propose the following three criteria for 
such a strategy.
22
 
First, a regulatory strategy should have something to say about 
what constitutes good and bad practices in the mine run of cases, in 
which there is no real doubt that the defendant is guilty of something, 
but in which there are important questions as to the severity of the of-
fense and the most appropriate sentence.  With an increasingly vast 
criminal code, a regulatory strategy that focuses merely on accurately 
separating the guilty from the innocent will necessarily be a modest 
one that is unlikely to do much to improve outsider opinions of the 
criminal justice system. 
Second, as Professor Wright indicates, a regulatory strategy should 
concentrate on the problem of legitimacy:
23
  what can be done to reas-
sure outsiders that plea bargaining is not an exercise in self-serving or 
arbitrary lenience on the part of the insiders, but rather a practice 
that is principled and genuinely conducted in the public’s interest.  As 
a considerable body of social psychology research has demonstrated, 
perceptions that government authorities have legitimacy are associ-
ated with higher levels of acceptance of official decisions, more coop-
eration with the authorities, and higher levels of law-abiding behav-
ior.
24
  These are compelling ends that should be of central concern to 
the criminal justice system. 
To diverge a bit from Professor Wright, though, I would focus a 
legitimacy-enhancing project particularly on defendants and victims.  
The public at large pays little attention to the vast majority of criminal 
cases, but defendants (always) and victims (often) tend to be far more 
engaged by, and are thus more likely to be influenced by, the quality 
of plea bargaining practices.  Moreover, in the few cases that do at-
tract wider notice, the public will often take its cues from the people 
closest to the case.  If the defendant, the victim, and the system insid-
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dural Justice]; Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Victims:  From Consultation to 
Guidelines, 91 MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1005373) [hereinafter O’Hear, Victims]. 
23
Wright, supra note 2, at 111. 
24
See, e.g., O’Hear, Procedural Justice, supra note 22 (manuscript at 13-14) (high-
lighting a study by Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 483, 487-88 (1988), and a study by Raymond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Pro-
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ers all express satisfaction with the plea bargaining process and out-
come, the public is unlikely to develop a more negative view. 
Finally, a regulatory strategy should try to bring to plea bargain-
ing, in some form or another, those characteristics of the trial that 
make the trial so much more attractive in the public imagination than 
the deal.  So, what’s good about trials?  I doubt that their appeal actu-
ally has much to do with the quality of their outcomes.  There is little 
reason to believe that juries are significantly more accurate decision 
makers than system insiders,
25
 and indeed jury verdicts not uncom-
monly become sources of public outrage (think of the McDonald’s 
coffee case or the O.J. Simpson trial).  Trials may or may not do a bet-
ter job of sorting the guilty from the innocent than plea bargaining, 
but any advantage they have is likely marginal. 
The real reason to prefer trials lies in their procedural attributes:  
they are public events; they provide interested parties with an oppor-
tunity to tell their side of the story; the decision-making criteria (em-
bodied in the jury instructions) are principled and transparent; basic 
norms of civility and decorum are closely observed; and a finely tuned 
system of checks and balances between the prosecutor, defendant, 
trial judge, jury, and appellate court offers robust safeguards against 
the arbitrary exercise of power.  These attributes, which sharply dis-
tinguish trials from the popular image of prosecutors and defense 
lawyers cutting deals in courthouse corridors, resonate with our high-
est ideals of due process, equal protection, and democratic self-
governance.  Moreover, these attributes also echo what the social psy-
chology research suggests in regard to legitimacy:  perceived legiti-
macy is at least as much a function of fair process as of fair outcomes, 
and fair process is largely a matter of voice (i.e., giving people an op-
portunity to tell their side of the story), neutrality, and respectful 
treatment.
26
 
 
25
For instance, one recent review of the relevant social science literature reached 
this equivocal conclusion: 
[T]he evidence paints a mixed picture.  Both judges and juries have advan-
tages and disadvantages as reliable re-creators of past events.  Given our cur-
rent limited data, one might conclude that juries, on balance, may have a 
slight advantage over judges as factfinders, not because of an actual superior-
ity in reliable factfinding, but because they are perceived as being supe-
rior . . . . 
Paul H. Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions:  Matching the Decision-
maker to the Decision Nature, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1124, 1145 (2005). 
26
See O’Hear, Procedural Justice, supra note 22 (manuscript at 12-13) (describing 
the research and conclusions of social psychologist Tom R. Tyler, who identifies 
“voice,” “neutrality,” “trustworthiness,” and “respect” as attributes of a decision-making 
process that is perceived to be fair). 
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In my view, then, a regulatory strategy ought to try to make plea 
bargaining processes look more like trial processes.  But not too 
much, or this regulatory strategy will devolve back into the dead-end 
debate over abolition.  The trick is to find ways of injecting the values 
of voice, neutrality, and respect into the plea bargaining process with-
out robbing plea bargaining of its efficiency advantages over the trial 
process.  This is difficult, but not impossible.  Let me provide just one 
example of a helpful, relatively low-cost reform:  transparent prosecu-
torial charging and plea negotiation guidelines.  Substantial field re-
search indicates that plea bargaining occurs around “going rates” for 
different offenses, which are quite well understood by system insid-
ers.
27
  Yet, the schedule of going rates is almost never reduced to writ-
ing nor made available to outsiders.  If prosecutors were to undertake 
this simple task and offer short, clear explanations at plea hearings for 
any deviations from the guidelines, it might go a long way toward reas-
suring defendants, victims, and the public at large that the system 
functions in a neutral, principled, and transparent manner—in short, 
that the system truly merits the respect of outsiders. 
I suspect that Professor Wright would, in fact, agree with much of 
what I have written in this last section.  As he has stated elsewhere, 
“When a prosecutor chooses to adopt a system that limits discretion 
and that allows greater public scrutiny of office decisionmaking, . . . it 
is reason to cheer.  It is time for more prosecutors to step out from 
behind the curtain, and operate the administrative justice machine in 
the open.”
28
  That seems to me a more compelling goal—and one that 
would make a more significant contribution to perceived legitimacy—
than the reduction of trial distortion. 
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